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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
TEVITA F. TAFUNA, Case No. 20090105-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 77- 18a-
l(l)(a) and 78A-4-103(2); and Utah R. App. P. 3(a). 
ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND PRESERVATION 
1. Did the trial court err (and/or was defense counsel ineffective) in failing to 
exclude an juror who had improper contact with a witness based on Utah's stringent rule 
that shifts the burden to "the prosecution to prove that the unauthorized contact did not 
influence the juror[J" State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 281 (Utah 1985), particularly since an 
untainted alternate juror was available? 
Preservation: The improper contact between the juror and the witness was brought 
to the court's attention, R 289:3-4, although the juror was allowed to remain on the panel 
and ultimately became the jury foreman. R 317. In the alternative, for unpreserved 
issues, the matter may be reviewed under the doctrines of plain error, manifest injustice, 
or ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Utah App. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
< 
1991); State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55 at ^ 40, 82 P.3d 1106 ("'[Manifest injustice' has been 
i 
defined as being 'synonymous with the "plain error" standard.'"); see also Casey, 2003 UT 
55 at f^ 41 (The manifest injustice or the plain error standard requires the appellant to 
show that '"(I) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; { 
and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the 
verdict is undermined.'"); see also Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, If 20, 94 P.3d 211 ("To 
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, 'a defendant must show (1) that counsel's 
performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
(2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the trial would have been different.'"). "When an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim cis raised for the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it 
presents a question of law.'" State v. Isiah Bo1 Cage Vos, 2007 Ut App 215, ^ [9 (Utah App 
2007) (citations omitted). 
2. Did the trial court err in not granting Mr. Tafuna's motion for a mistrial 
after information - which the parties previously had agreed should be excluded, was then 
improperly admitted for the jury's consideration? "We review a denial of a motion for 
mistrial for abuse of discretion." State v. Shipp, 2004 UT App 40 (Utah App. 2004), 
rev 'd on other grounds, State v. Shipp. 116 P.3d 317, 2005 UT 35. 
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Preservation: Defense counsel moved for a mistrial during the course of trial. R. 
294:295-296. The trial court denied the defendant's motion. R. 294:297. 
STATUTES. RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The texts of the following relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are 
contained in this brief or Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2) 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-1105(b)(1) Utah R. App. P. 3(a) 
Utah Code Ann. §77-17-11 Utah R. App. P. 23B 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(a) Utah R. Crim. P. 170) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about November 7, 2007, the State filed an Information against Tevita F. 
Tafuna, which alleged the crimes of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony; and 
Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a 
class A misdemeanor. R 1-4. On November 16, 2007, an Amended Information was 
filed; however, the charges were not significantly modified for purposes of appeal. R. 6-9. 
Mr. Tafuna's case proceeded to trial on October 22, 2008. After a three-day trial, 
the jury convicted Mr. Tafuna of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. R. 203; 290:57-59. The dangerous weapon charge was 
dismissed upon the Defendant's motion. R. 189; 294:326. At sentencing, the court 
3 
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imposed, inter alia, an indeterminate term of five years to life at the Utah State Prison. R 
( 
291:10. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 27, 2007, Mr. Tafuna attended a Halloween party, hosted by Grant ( 
Wolmuth, his brother, Joel, and Mark McMillian. R. 295:11-18. Mr. Tafuna arrived with 
two acquaintances, PJ Valdez and Rochelle Noble. R. 295:16. 
Grant testified that people were using alcohol and marijuana at the party, including 
Mr. Tafuna. R 295: 71. While Mr. Tafuna was in the kitchen socializing, a commotion 
broke out in a nearby bedroom. R. 295:18. Mr. Tafuna heard someone yell something 
and everyone in the kitchen started to gravitate towards a nearby hallway. R. 295:21. 
Tafiina proceeded to the hallway with the crowd. R. 295:21; 295:40. Although several 
people were in front of Mr. Tafuna, his height enabled him to see over their heads. R. 
295:21. Mr. Tafuna saw and heard a heated argument ensuing between PJ and numerous 
other individuals. R. 295:22. 
Fearing for PJ's safety, Mr. Tafuna moved through the crowd to get closer to the 
commotion. R. 295:22. He entered the bedroom and asked what was going on. R. 
295:22. Tafuna was told it was none of his business. R. 295:23. 
Nevertheless, he tried to neutralize the situation. He wanted to get PJ out of there. 
R. 295:23. A male dressed as a pirate told Mr. Tafuna that he could not leave. R. 295:23. 
Mr. Tafuna replied that he was going to leave because he didn't have anything to do with 
4 
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the argument and he was just concerned for PJ's safety. R. 295:24. The male dressed as 
a pirate then reasserted that Mr. Tafima could not leave and brandished a knife. R. 
295:24. The knife appeared to be a real knife. R. 295:24-25. After Tafuna's own life 
was threatened, he focused on his personal well-being. R. 295:40, 42, 43. 
To protect himself, Mr. Tafuna picked up a pocketknife that he found in the 
bedroom. R. 295:25; 295:41. Tafuna opened the pocketknife and told everybody to get 
back. R. 295:25. Mr. Tafuna then fled downstairs and out the back patio. R. 395:28; 
295:26. Once in the backyard, Mr. Tafuna continued in his attempts to escape. He 
located a gate, but couldn't get it open. R. 295:27. Mr. Tafuna was unable to open the 
gate due to the angry mob that was following him. R. 295:27. Tafuna displayed the knife 
in a defensive way to try to keep people away from him. R. 295:53-54. 
Eventually, the gate opened. R. 295:29. Mr. Tafuna ran through the gate towards 
his car. R. 295:29. Upon reaching the driveway, Mr. Tafuna threw away the knife. R. 
295:29. However, as he reached for the car door, he was grabbed from behind. R. 
295:30. Tafuna was unable to see who grabbed him. R. 295:30. His arms were locked 
behind him and he was forced away from the vehicle. R. 295:31-32. 
Figuratively and almost literally, Tafuna was blind-sided with a hit to his eye. R. 
295:32. He could not see out of his injured eye. R. 295:32. (At the time of the trial, Mr. 
Tafuna still experienced permanent damage to his vision. R. 295:33.) After being 
5 
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assaulted, Mr. Tafuna continued to struggle with his attacker. R. 295:33. He eventually 
broke free and started running down the street. R. 295:34. 
As Mr. Tafuna was trying to run away, he was pushed from behind. R. 295:34. 
Mr. Tafuna tumbled down the sloped ground. R. 295:34. Upon regaining his balance, { 
Mr. Tafuna continued to try to get away. R. 295:34. A group of five or six people 
continued to chase Mr. Tafuna. R. 295:35. Mr. Tafuna was thrown to the ground again. 
R. 295:35. The angry mob punched, kicked, and beat Tafuna, R. 295:35, with some 
discussion voiced over how they were going to attack him. R. 295:36. 
Badly injured, Mr. Tafuna was unable to get up. R. 295:36-37. He was bleeding 
from his eye and shoulder. R. 295:37. Eventually, the violence subsided and the mob 
dispersed. R. 295:36. A male helped Mr. Tafuna get up and escorted him into the 
vehicle. R. 295:36. 
The State witnesses portrayed a much different picture of what happened. 
Mark Buyer testified that while receiving a tour of the residence by Grant 
Wolmuth, Grant opened the door to his bedroom. R. 294:18. Mr. Buyer was right behind 
Grant. R. 294:18. Once the bedroom door was opened, Mr. Buyer said that both PJ 
Valdez and Mr. Tafuna were inside the bedroom. R. 294:18. PJ Valdez appeared to be 
stealing things. R. 294:19. Mr. Buyer also stated that the knife came from Mr. Tafuna's 
pocket. R. 294:13. 
6 
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Another person near the scene, Cody Fehr, testified that he focused on PJ Valdez, 
the person who had the stolen property. R. 294:44. Mr. Fehr, who had consumed alcohol 
and marijuana that evening, R. 294:27, stated that PJ Valdez went down the stairs before 
Mr. Tafuna. R. 294:31-32. Mr. Fehr then went into the backyard by the gate where he 
saw about ten people surrounding Mr. Tafuna and PJ Valdez. R. 294:33. Mr. Fahr 
thought that Mr. Tafuna was guarding PJ Valdez as Mr. Tafuna kept the crowd at bay by 
displaying the knife. R. 294:34. Upon opening the gate, PJ Valdez ran to the vehicle, and 
put stolen items in the car. R. 294:35. Mr. Fehr later retrieved the stolen items from the 
vehicle. R. 294:35. Mr. Fehr testified that because he couldn't hold both the stolen 
property and a knife, the knife slipped out of his hand. R. 294:52. After putting the items 
inside, Mr. Fehr went back outside where he witnessed PJ Valdez stab Joel Wolmuth. R. 
294:37. Mr. Fehr also stated that PJ Valdez stabbed TC Vasquez. R. 294:49. 
Ms. Gallo testified that as Mr. Tafuna was exiting the house, he was carrying a 
black backpack. R. 294:65. Ms. Gallo also stated that PJ Valdez stabbed her boyfriend 
Shawn Biel. R. 294:70. 
Another witness who had consumed alcohol and hallucinogenic mushrooms on the 
date of the incident, Shawn Biel, testified that Mr. Tafuna came down the stairs after PJ 
Valdez. R. 294:79. Mr. Biel stated that after exiting the backyard, Mr. Tafuna was 
carrying a circular bag. R. 294:81. Mr. Biel admitted to throwing Mr. Tafuna to the 
ground two times. R. 294:82-84. Biel kicked and punched Mr. Tafuna, R. 294:93, 
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although he claimed that Mr. Tafuna still had a knife. Biel was stabbed in the back while 
he was attacking Tafuna, who was still on the ground. R. 294:84-86. The State 
acknowledged that the co-defendant, PJ Valdez, was responsible for the stabbings and 
that he was charged accordingly. R 291:4. { 
At the conclusion of the three-day trial, the jury convicted Mr. Tafuna of 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony. R. 203; 290:57-59. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Error occurred when a juror engaged in improper contact with a witness. ff[T]he 
burden is on the prosecution to prove that the unauthorized contact did not influence the 
juror." State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 281 (Utah 1985); id. at 280 ("improper contacts may 
influence a juror in ways he or she may not even be able to recognize"); see also State v. 
Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("mere denial of prejudice by the 
tainted juror is . . . insufficient to overcome the presumption of prejudice."). 
Some jurisdictions have held that such [juror/witness] conversations do not fatally 
affect the impartiality of the jury unless the defendant can show that actual 
prejudice resulted from the contact. This Court, however, has enunciated a more 
stringent rule in recognition of the fact that prejudice may well exist even though it 
is not provable and even though a person who has been tainted may not, himself, 
be able to recognize that fact. 
Pike, 712 P.2d at 281 (citations omitted). Due to the unique burden shifting requirement 
of Pike and the circumstances in this case, the trial court erred in not excluding the juror 
from deliberations. Alternatively, Mr. Tafuna submits that counsel performed deficiently 
and prejudicially in not appropriately moving to exclude the juror. 
8 
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Prior to trial, the parties also agreed to exclude from the jury any reference 
connecting the defendant to a jacket or to identification found within the jacket because 
of the unsubstantiated inference of theft or that he was in unlawful possession of another 
person's property. Contrary to such an agreement, however, State witnesses later 
expressly tied him to the jacket, together with the accompanying innuendos and improper 
inferences. The trial court should have granted a mistrial as the parties could not undo the 
damage or cure the inadmissible reference. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129 
(1968) (citation omitted) ("The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome 
by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction "). 
In a case where conflicting and irreconcilable facts were presented to the jury, impugning 
the defendant's character improperly misguided the jury's deliberations and, as conceded 
by the State, it would have been difficult to cure the error or to "un-ring the bell." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO EXCUSE A 
JUROR WHO COMMUNICATED WITH THE STATE'S WITNESSES 
It is well-settled law that, "Anything more than the most incidental contact during 
the trial between witnesses and jurors casts doubt upon the impartiality of the jury and 
at best gives the appearance of the absence of impartiality." State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 
280 (Utah 1985). Such improper contact results in the attachment of a rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice because it has the effect of "breeding a sense of familiarity that 
could clearly affect the juror's judgment as to credibility." Pike, 712 P.2d at 281; cf. Utah 
9 
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R. Crim. P. 17(j); Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-11 (officer in charge of jury in deliberations 
shall "not permit any person to speak to or communicate with them or to do so himself 
except upon the order of the court). 
As explained by our supreme court, even relatively innocuous circumstances that ( 
involve contacts between a juror and witness are unacceptable: 
In State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 P. 941 (1925), a juror rode to and from the 
courthouse with one of the prosecution witnesses. The trial judge denied a motion 
for a new trial because the prosecution witness did not intend to influence the 
juror, and the juror, by affidavit, stated he had not discussed the trial, nor had he 
been influenced in his judgment in voting on the verdict. 
On appeal, this Court held that it could not "be said that appellant had the 
full benefit of trial by an impartial jury and was in no way influenced except by the 
evidence and the instructions of the court...." Id. at 419, 237 P. at 943. The Court 
stated that one reason for the presumption is the inherent difficulty in proving how 
or whether a juror has in fact been influenced by conversing with a participant in 
the trial. Id. 
Another reason for the presumption is the deleterious effect upon the 
judicial process because of the appearance of impropriety. In Glazier v. Cram, 71 
Utah 465, 267 P. 188 (1928), we held that the mingling of jurors and prominent 
witnesses could not be condoned because "it is probable that a doubt must and will 
continue to exist in the mind of the losing party and that of his friends as to 
whether or not he had a fair trial." Id. at 470, 267 P. at 190. Accord State v. Crank, 
105 Utah at 268, 141 P.2d 178, 194 (1943) ("In such instances, the verdict of the 
jury, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion.") (Emphasis in original.) 
Due consideration for the potential and often unprovable tainting of a juror 
by contacts between jurors and others involved in a trial that are more than brief 
and inadvertent encounters, leads us to reaffirm the proposition that a rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice arises from any unauthorized contact during a trial 
between witnesses, attorneys or court personnel and jurors which goes beyond a 
mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact. The possibility that improper 
contacts may influence a juror in ways he or she may not even be able to recognize 
and that a defendant may be left with questions as to the impartiality of the jury, 
10 
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leads to the conclusion that when the contact is more than incidental, the burden is 
on the prosecution to prove that the unauthorized contact did not influence the 
juror. 
State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985) (footnote omitted). 
Noteworthy in the Pike opinion were the nature of the cited facts from Anderson 
that warranted reversal and a new trial. The juror in Anderson merely "rode to and from 
the courthouse with one of the prosecution witnesses" but the juror and witness "had not 
discussed the trial." Pike, 712 P.2d at 280. Despite the apparent innocuous circumstance 
of the juror and witness simply being together for a brief period of time, the Anderson 
opinion questioned whether defendant Anderson "had the full benefit of trial by an 
impartial jury...." Id. 
The Pike factual circumstances appeared equally innocuous. The Pike jurors and a 
witness did nothing more than discuss an incident (unrelated to the ongoing trial) 
regarding cleaning a patio that caused him to limp. 
In this case, an important prosecution witness, who was both the arresting 
officer and a witness at the scene of the altercation, engaged in conversation in the 
hall of the courthouse during a recess with three jurors regarding a personal 
incident, i.e., an accident he had sustained while cleaning his patio which caused 
him to limp. Immediately after the court reconvened, the trial court questioned the 
officer in camera on the record about the conversation. The questioning was brief 
and did not disclose the entire contents of the conversation. There is no other 
evidence as to the scope and subject matter of the conversation since a transcript of 
the post-verdict questioning of the jurors has not been provided on this appeal. 
From what is reported in the transcript of the first hearing on the matter, the 
conversation amounted to more than a brief, incidental contact and no doubt had 
the effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly affect the jurors 
judgment as to credibility. It was sufficient to warrant a presumption of prejudice. 
Indeed, even if the jurors had denied that they were influenced by the encounter in 
11 
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the post-trial hearing, that is not enough to rebut the presumption of prejudice. 
Accordingly, the conviction must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new ( 
trial. 
Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 281 (Utah 1985). Even with the exchange of seemingly innocuous 
personal matters, the supreme court adhered to a heightened analytical standard: ( 
Some jurisdictions have held that such conversations do not fatally affect the 
impartiality of the jury unless the defendant can show that actual prejudice resulted 
from the contact. This Court, however, has enunciated a more stringent rule in 
recognition of the fact that prejudice may well exist even though it is not provable 
and even though a person who has been tainted may not, himself, be able to 
recognize that fact. 
The rule in this jurisdiction is that improper juror contact with witnesses or 
parties raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. 
Pike, 712 P.2d at 280 (citations omitted). 
The facts in Pike and Anderson are similar to the alleged innocuous conduct in Mr. 
Tafuna's case. At first blush the situation may appear innocent — as suggested by the trial 
court — but the heightened scrutiny mandated by Pike reveals that the juror/witness 
contact here was equally improper and on par with the cited factual violations. 
During Mr. Tafuna's trial proceedings, one of the jurors improperly communicated 
with State witnesses about medication, prolonged waiting due to court delays, the 
weather, and airport carpeting: 
THE COURT: It has come to our attention you were talking to some 
witnesses from the prosecution's side there and it's something 
we just can't do. So the question I have for you, I have to 
look into i t -
JUROR: Yes. Yes. 
12 
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THE COURT: How did you come to talk to them? 
JUROR: Well, you know. I have got a lot of meds with me, obviously, 
we were discussing it this morning. Monday when I came 
through security, no problem. This morning, no problem. 
This afternoon they wanted to look at everything, which is 
great, it is just makes it safer for me and I don't care. But it 
did make me a bit late coming upstairs. 
I saw these people and I thought, well, I saw those people this 
morning. I thought they were fellow jurors, they weren't. I 
turned on the wrong hallway. I recall the only thing we 
discussed down there - 1 got this - we're waiting there and 
had been waiting. One of the first guys said, "I have been 
here since 8:00 this morning." And I said, "Well, you could 
be in someplace like Chicago in a airport, you know, with a 
blizzard." So it's - we were discussing airport carpeting. We 
realized the mistake and that's all we discussed. 
Maybe two minutes, that's the entire conversation that we 
had. 
THE COURT: 
JUROR: 
THE COURT: 
JUROR: 
THE COURT: 
JUROR: 
THE COURT: 
MR. JANZEN: 
THE COURT: 
Anything else happen? 
No. 
Okay. Thank you. 
Yes. I apologize for screwing this up. 
Your apology is accepted. 
It ain't going to happen again, I'll guarantee you that. 
Before you leave, anybody want to ask any questions? 
No. No. 
Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Thank you. 
13 
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(Whereupon the juror exited chambers.) 
i 
R. 289 at 3-4. 
The above type of cursory court questioning did not rebut the presumption of 
prejudice. State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("mere denial of { 
prejudice by the tainted juror is . . . insufficient to overcome the presumption of 
prejudice.1'). In fact, the plain language of the colloquy revealed that the lower court did 
not even explore whether the juror's judgment would be impaired. Cf. State v. Shipp, 86 
P.3d 763, 2004 UT App 40, % 16, rev 'd on other grounds. State v. Shipp. 116 P.3d 317, 
2005 UT 35. 
Further, the court erred in simply assuming that the juror would likely not "be 
influenced in any way pro or con[,]" R 289:5, yet it twice passed up the opportunity to 
actually ask him about it. Id. The juror may have indeed felt bad about the improper 
contact, but such an emotion is an issue separate and apart from the court's duty to 
analytically confirm and determine whether a "biasing influence" resulted, Shipp, 2004 
UT App 40, ^  14, or whether it bred a "sense of familiarity that could clearly affect the 
jurors judgment as to credibility." Pike, 712 P.2d at 280. Because of the improper 
contact, the encounter was presumed to affect the juror's ability to assess the witness's 
credibility, absent the prejudice being rebutted. Id. It was not rebutted here. 
14 
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This Court's analysis from Shipp lends guidance to Mr. Tafuna's case. Although 
our high court reversed Shipp for a procedural basis inapposite to Mr. Tafuna's situation, 
the rationale underlying the Shipp intermediate opinion bears repeating: 
[One, even assuming a witness's] "apparent passiveness in the conversation^]... 
the Pike rule is concerned with the biasing effect on the juror, not the witness's or 
the State's fault in the matter. We have previously held a conversation instigated 
by a juror to be improper and to raise a presumption of prejudice." 2004 UT App. 
40140. 
[Two, contrary to a State contention] "that the conversation was 'so brief and 
unrevealing that no reason exists to presume the encounter affected [the juror's] 
ability to assess the [witness's] credibility[,]'... the Pike rule is concerned not only 
with the biasing influence on the juror herself, but also with the 'deleterious effect 
upon the judicial process because of the appearance of impropriety.' Further not 
only the subject matter, but also the scope of the conversation, are irrelevant in 
determining whether the presumption of prejudice attaches." 
State v. Shipp, 86 P.3d 763, 2004 UT App 40, fflf 13, 14 (citing State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 
277 (Utah 1985); State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 109 (Utah App. 1992); Logan City v. Carlsen, 
799 P.2d 244 (Utah App. 1990)); see also Logan City, 799 P.2d 224 (Orme, J. 
concurring) (citing State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987) ("As Erickson makes 
clear, any contact 'more than a brief, incidental contact where only remarks of civility 
[are] exchanged,' gives rise to a presumption of prejudice, and therefore to an order of 
reversal, which cannot be overcome even with testimony by the 'tainted' juror that he or 
she was not 'influenced by the encounter.'"). 
The trial court and the parties appeared captured by the subject matter of the 
juror's explanation or even his credibility and emotion. However, the rambling, 
15 
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disjointed summary by the juror suggested that his actual discussions about medication, 
court delays, the weather, and airport carpeting extended beyond "two minutes." Moving 
from one subject matter to the next, unlike the abrupt lack of transition suggested by the 
juror, probably involved a greater level of banter in their conversations with each side ( 
volunteering information that kept their exchange going. Regardless, since scope and 
subject matter constituted irrelevant considerations to the trial court's inquiry, id, the 
court's colloquy did not appropriately address, let alone rebut, the presumption of 
prejudice. State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 281 (Utah 1985) (the situation in Pike, like in Mr. 
Tafunafs case, involved a "conversation [that] amounted to more than a brief, incidental 
contact and no doubt had the effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly 
affect the jurors judgment as to credibility"). 
Moreover, even taking the juror's statements at face value, abbreviated discussions 
nevertheless trigger "the inherent difficulty in proving how or whether a juror has in fact 
been influenced by conversing with a participant in the trial[,]" together with "the 
deleterious effect upon the judicial process because of the appearance of impropriety." 
Pike, 712 P.2d at 280; see also R 317 (of heightened concern in Mr. Tafuna's case was 
that Juror #20, who had engaged in the discussions with the witnesses, not only 
participated in the deliberations, he ultimately became the jury Foreperson). 
Due to the unique burden shifting requirement of Pike and the circumstances of 
this case, the trial court erred in not appropriately turning to the State to deal with the 
16 
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element of prejudice. ff[A] rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises from any 
unauthorized contact during a trial between witnesses, attorneys or court personnel and 
jurors which goes beyond a mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact... [and] the 
burden is on the prosecution to prove that the unauthorized contact did not influence the 
juror." Pike, 712 P.2d at 281; id. at 280 ("improper contacts may influence a juror in 
ways he or she may not even be able to recognize1'); see also State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 
1009, 1011 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("mere denial of prejudice by the tainted juror is . . . 
insufficient to overcome the presumption of prejudice."); State v. Shipp. 116 P.3d 317, 
2005 UT 35 (presumption of prejudice applies where, as here, the juror/witness contact 
occurred after voir dire and jury selection). 
After the court's colloquy with the juror, the State suggested using an alternate 
juror to remedy the situation. R 289:5. The State did not address its burden because it 
was never directed to, although its suggested remedy was essentially to assume, 
arguendo, that the juror was tainted and that an alternate would remove the taint and cure 
the problem. However, because the court declined to do so then pursuant to the State's 
suggestion, R 289:5, and again later before the close of trial at the urging of defense 
counsel, R 290.-55-56,1 the issue seems more befitting of a trial court error than under an 
1
 When the improper juror/witness contact was brought to the court's attention, it stated, "It 
has come to our attention you were talking to some witnesses from the prosecution's side there 
and it's something we just can't do." R 289:3 (emphasis added). Fresh in its mind, the court 
recognized that the juror was not allowed to talk to prosecution witnesses even though the court 
later claimed that the juror did not "know who they were." R 290 at 56. To clarify, the juror 
thought the people he spoke with "were fellow jurors, they werenft[,]M R 289:3, which did 
17 
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IAC classification. Of note, had such a remedy occurred, the alternate jurors expressed 
that they would not have convicted Mr. Tafiina. R 290:61-62. 
Alternatively, Mr. Tafuna submits that prior defense counsel provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel ("IAC") in not timely recognizing or appropriately raising this issue 4 
with the trial court. Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, ^ 20, 94 P.3d 211 ("To establish 
ineffective assistance of counsel, 'a defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance 
was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but 
for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the trial would have been different.'"). 
Counsel attempted to re-raise the issue later in the proceedings, but the trial court 
declined to further consider the issue due to the earlier lack of objection. R 290 at 55-56. 
In addition to defense counsel arguably inviting error or waiving the matter by not 
appropriately objecting, R 289:5, the appellate review process2 was hampered because the 
prosecution also was not put to its burden to establish the lack of prejudice. The above 
authority reflects unreasonably deficient performance by defense counsel. Under Utah's 
stringent rule, prejudice was also established as a new trial should have been granted. 
nothing to detract from his improper contact with "some witnesses from the prosecution's side.' 
2
 Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 23B, Mr. Tafuna moved unsuccessfully to remand the case to 
the trial court to factually address such matters. 
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT A 
MISTRIAL AFTER A STATE WITNESS INFORMED THE JURY OF 
PREVIOUSLY EXCLUDED AND INADMISSIBLE INFORMATION 
Prior to the start of trial, the State and counsel for Mr. Tafuna stipulated to the 
exclusion of information that connected the defendant to the contents of a jacket: 
MR. SIMMS: 
MR. PLAYER: 
MR. SIMMS: 
The only other two stipulations that we have is we are not 
going to talk about a gun that Mark McMillan had, it's not 
really relevant to the case. 
Right. 
And then there is also a fake ID - well, people's IDs found in 
that leather jacket. We won't talk about, speculate as to 
whose IDs they are and what -
THE COURT: 
MR. PLAYER: 
Is that going to come out at all? 
No. 
MR. SIMMS: No. 
R. 294:174 
Despite those earlier representations, at trial the State's case manager, Detective 
Kodie Gill, disclosed to the jury the previously excluded information about the 
identifications. 
MR. JANZEN: 
DET. GILL: 
MR. JANZEN: 
Okay. With regards to your investigations did you have an 
opportunity to receive property after the October 27th? 
Yes. 
And what in particular did you receive? 
19 
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DET. GILL: A couple of iPods, a cellphone, a leather coat, a wallet inside 
the leather coat with several people - several different people 
type IDs. 
R. 294:292. Unfortunately, the Detective's statement, together with the testimony by Mr. 
Marty Newbury, tied the jacket to the defendant. 
MR. PLAYER: Is there anything left in your car that was there when you got 
to the party? 
MR. NEWBURY: A jacket. 
MR. PLAYER: And do you know how that jacket got to your car? 
MR. NEWBURY: My cousin TC went to go get my iPod - or his iPod from my 
car and as he was going to my car [Tevita] was asking him 
where he could put his coat. My cousin told - TC told him 
that he would take it for him. And then the next day I got in 
my car and it was in my car. 
MR. PLAYER: When do you discover this jacket in your car? 
MR. NEWBURY: The next morning. 
MR. PLAYER: Now, do you know at that time whose jacket that is? 
MR. NEWBURY: I believe it's [Tevita's] jacket. Because, like I said, he was 
asking where he could put it. 
MR. SIMMS: I'll object to speculation as to whose jacket it is. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
R. 294:151. 
MR. PLAYER: I want to show you what's been marked as State's Exhibit 35. 
Do you recognize this j acket? 
MR. NEWBURY: I do. 
20 
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MR. PLAYER: Where did you see this jacket? 
MR. NEWBURY: The Defendant was wearing it. 
MR. PLAYER: The Defendant was wearing this jacket? 
MR. NEWBURY: Yeah, that's the jacket he gave to my cousin and my cousin 
put it in my car. 
MR. PLAYER: So you saw him wearing it at the party? 
MR. NEWBURY: Yes. 
MR. PLAYER: And that's the same jacket TC gave you? 
MR. NEWBURY: It's the jacket TC put in my car. 
MR. PLAYER: Okay. And that is - is that the jacket that you found in your 
car? 
MR. NEWBURY: Yes. 
MR. PLAYER: And that you returned to Sandy Police Department? 
MR. NEWBURY: Yes. 
R. 294:163. 
The State admitted that they failed to inform Detective Gill of the stipulation to 
exclude all references to the identifications: 
THE COURT: Please be seated. First of all, how did that happen? 
MR. JANZEN: Your Honor, we failed to mention that to the officer that was 
an issue that we discussed beforehand. We didn't [expect] 
that to come out. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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MR. SIMMS: We move for a mistrial, Your Honor. 
R. 294:295-296. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial, R. 294:297, 
notwithstanding the prosecutor's expressed acknowledgment that, "I don't know if a jury 
instruction could correct this error." R 294:296. 
In a failed attempt to remedy the State's lack of instruction and the prejudice 
caused by the admission of the previously excluded information, the State withdrew the 
jacket, State's Exhibit 35 and the court instructed the jury. 
MR. PLAYER: ...[U]pon further review and consideration the State has 
determined that it is going to withdraw State's Exhibit 35, as 
it is not related to this case. 
THE COURT: All right. 
THE COURT: It's just the same as if it were stricken. The jacket that came 
in you're not to - you're to disregard any testimony relating to 
it or - to the jacket or anything that was found in the jacket. 
And it's stricken and it is as if it were never entered into the 
record at this point. 
R 295:14. 
Despite the trial court's order to disregard the jacket reference, the claimed "cure" 
of a limiting instruction cannot un-ring the "ringing of the bell" or the improper 
admission of inadmissible evidence. "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can 
be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated 
fiction " Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129 (1968) (citation omitted). "The 
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fact of the matter is that too often such admonition against misuse is intrinsically 
ineffective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from 
the brains of the jurors. The admonition therefore become a futile collocation of words 
and fails of its purpose as a legal protection to defendants against whom such a 
declaration should not tell." Id. 
Moreover, defendant's possession of such identifications suggested more than 
improperly possessing another person(s) identification, it also carried the equally 
damaging label of being a crime of dishonesty. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1105(b)(1) (a 
person in possession of "multiple identifying documents with knowledge that he is not 
entitled to obtain or possess the multiple identifying documents" is guilty of a third degree 
felony). In a case where conflicting and irreconcilable facts were presented to the jury 
(and Mr. Tafuna testified), impugning the defendant's character improperly tainted its 
deliberation process. State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880 (Utah App., 1992) (citations omitted) 
("Evidence is unfairly prejudicial: if it has a tendency to influence the outcome of the trial 
by improper means, or if it appeals to the juryfs sympathies, or arouses its sense of horror, 
provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to base its decision on something 
other than the established propositions of the case."). Mr. Tafuna asks this Court to 
reverse his conviction and to remand the matter for a new trial. 
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POSITION ON ORAL ARGUMENT 
Oral argument is requested. This Court may be aided in its decision-making 
process by the parties' participation and responses during oral argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Tafuna respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction and remand 
his case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this ™ day of March, 2011. 
Ronald S. Fujino f 
Attorney for Mr. Tafuna 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I have caused the original and seven copies of the foregoing to 
be hand-delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P. O. Box 
140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to the Utah Attorney General's 
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this %[ day of March, 2011. 
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Addendum A 
(Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions) 
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RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Const, art I, § 12 [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole 
or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any 
pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery 
is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l Appeals — When proper. 
(1) A defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from: 
(a) a final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, 
he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
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they have agreed on a verdict. He shall return them to court when they have agreed 
and the court has so ordered, or when otherwise ordered by the court. < 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of < 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
Utah R. App. P. 3(a). Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a 
district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal 
from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing 
a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule 
4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action 
as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the 
appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
Utah R. App. P. 23B. Motion to remand for findings necessary to determination of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the 
court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary 
for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. The motion shall be available only upon a nonspeculative allegation of 
facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a 
determination that counsel was ineffective. 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon a 
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing of 
the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed after 
oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from remanding the 
case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim has been raised and 
the motion would have been available to a party. 
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UtahR.Crim.P. 17G) 
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other 
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the 
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person 
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while the 
jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so 
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with the 
trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a specified time. 
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